Māori Mārx by Barber, Simon
This article gathers together some provisional materials for the construction of a Māori Mārx. I 
begin by following Marx’s thought as he continually 
complexifies his understanding of the determinants of 
history in his search for the proper starting place for 
a materialist dialectics. I leave historical Marx at the 
close of his life, occupied with the passionate study of 
Indigenous modes of life. Returning his gaze, I read 
Marx from an Indigenous perspective, sketching some 
of the lineaments of a Māori Mārx for whom whakapapa 
is the central concept. From this perspective, I describe 
an Indigenous, comparative, and historical materialism, 
termed ‘geometry of life’, that seeks the consistency 
between modes of life and the modes of thinking that 
emanate within them. I close by suggesting that we 
must conceive of ourselves as part of the ensemble 
powers of a proletarian Papatūānuku if we are to 
conserve the earth and abolish capital.
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The increasingly likely possibility of planetary ecological 
collapse makes an urgent demand on our present.1 The task 
ahead has two aspects. On the one hand, we must dismantle 
the machinery of Papatūānuku’s, and so our, domination and 
desecration. Capitalism is incompatible with our continuing 
to live on this planet. The second task, inseparable and 
simultaneous with the first, demands that we find new ways 
of living with each other and the earth. Capitalism renders 
the world into cheap nature (the earth as raw material, fuel, 
and dumping ground for the production process) and cheap 
labour (labour-power paid for at less than the cost of its 
reproduction) by devaluing both.2 The more general field of 
work that goes into maintaining and reproducing workers 
for capital is externalised by the wage relation. Likewise, 
the human/nature distinction hides capitalism’s parasitic 
reliance on Papatūānuku for its own functioning. These two 
moments are aspects of the same process. As Peter Linebaugh 
 
1  Authorship of this text is, of course, multiple. I would like to 
thank Miri Davidson, Jack Foster, Campbell Jones, Carl Mika, and an 
anonymous reviewer for their incredibly generous engagement with 
earlier versions of this text. 
2  These terms are borrowed from Jason Moore, ‘The Rise of Cheap 
Nature,’ in Anthropocene or Capitalocene? Nature, History, and the 
Crisis of Capitalism (Oakland: PM Press, 2016).
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has said, ‘reproduction precedes social production. Touch the women, 
touch the rock’.3
Capital’s ability to reproduce itself approaches a hard limit in the 
breakdown not just of the reproduction of workers but in the reproduction 
of life as a planetary system. Capitalists, spurred by the persistent anxiety 
of how to preserve class domination in a rapidly collapsing climate, make 
plans for apocalypse bunkers in Aotearoa New Zealand, or dream of 
infinite accumulation enabled through intergalactic expansion.4 We might 
wish to make different plans and dream different dreams than those of the 
capitalists. A Māori Mārx—improvised, imagined, collective, ensemble—
has a vital contribution to make towards this life-and-death struggle. 
In the last few years of his life, Marx’s thought underwent a profound 
transformation, registered in his focus on the multiple modes of life 
expressed in non-Western and non-capitalist societies. Marx’s thinking in 
his final years can be seen as a more expansive arc, curling back alongside 
the preoccupations of his youth. Marx’s early writings from his time living 
in Paris from 1843 before his exile in 1845 express dazzling, exploratory, 
and expansive research and thinking textured by discontinuity and 
incompleteness. They were worked out with and against the German 
Idealism of Hegel and the materialism and philosophical anthropology of 
Feuerbach. The writings of this period also document Marx’s exuberant 
engagement with French political theory, especially that of utopian socialists 
such as Fourier and St Simon, as well as his first forays into British political 
economy. Where Marx returned later in his life to investigate the possible 
configurations of human existence, he did so not through the figure of the 
abstract human as derived from philosophical anthropology but through 
the empirical existence of Indigenous peoples. This work remains a radical 
open-endedness at the end of Marx’s life. Marx’s hearty engagement with 
peoples outside and other to his own thinking suggests that another radical 
3  Peter Linebaugh, The Magna Carta Manifesto: Liberties and Commons for All 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).
4  Anna-Maria Murtola, ‘How the Global Tech Elite Imagine the Future,’ Economic 
and Social Research Aotearoa, Report no. 11 (November 2018). 
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transformation of his thought was under way at the close of his life. One 
vital conclusion can be drawn from this, one often stubbornly refused by 
Marxisms of many stripes: Marx himself saw the need for his theory to 
undergo transformation through engagement with modes of life beyond 
those of Europe and conceptual frameworks beyond those of European 
construction.  
My aim is not simply to try to simulate for Marx a textual engagement 
with te ao Māori, looking over his shoulder, as it were, as he tried to 
discern the lineaments of Māori modes of life and thought by reading 
early anthropological accounts. An attempt to revive only this Māori Mārx 
would be akin to the rather kitsch act of drawing a moko on Marx’s face. 
This might be useful to Marxism to an extent, providing insight into a 
terrain that Marx’s thinking had entered into but never described. It would 
remain, however, a perspective limited by Marx’s own position. But there is 
a second, more dimly lit, Māori Mārx that observes the first from a different 
position. This figure is a Māori reading of Marx, something more difficult 
for me to construct: a conceptual matrix drawn from a number of Māori 
thinkers, supported by the fullness of my experience studying at wānanga, 
provides an initial orientation from which to develop this second reading. 
Beyond whatever trajectory Marx’s thought may have suggested, there 
are more pressing reasons for the construction of a Māori Mārx. There is a 
certain violence of abstraction in the perspective that demands the spread 
of a homogenous Marxist logic around the globe, one that reflects the same 
violence inherent in the expansion of capitalism. At best, such a perspective 
sees other modes of life and modes of thought only as gaps to be sketched 
in to an existing schema. Instead, my conviction is that Marx’s thought 
must undergo profound transformation through its encounters with what 
is beyond it. New concrete universals must be built up from the ground of 
our relational difference if we are to open out from the narrows of ‘scientific 
socialism’ and into the wider main of human emancipatory endeavour. We 
must open out, however, without falling into the wash of a deracinated, 
placeless thinking, abstracted from our practical cohabitation, from which 
we would then have to conjure a world beyond this one from thin air. We 
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must, then, think from the deep connections of the place in which we find 
ourselves and with the long thinking of this place to which Māori give 
voice. Tikanga Māori and mātauranga Māori are names for this thinking. 
As emanations of the long inhabitance of this place, they assert their own 
validity. Their engagement requires no justification. This is not to say that 
tikanga and mātauranga are vestiges of some static tradition; they are modes 
of thought that flow in to our present in a way that is vital, dynamic, and 
contemporary. They are not bracketed at the point of European arrival, as 
is the case with Pākehā memory that begins with the Nation.5 
The question that remains, then, is why Marx? The real, historical arrival 
of capitalism and its ongoing clash and entanglement with te ao Māori 
refuses any purity of analytic position. By listening to Marx, we can learn 
to listen for the ructions and stresses of capitalism’s operations so as better 
to inform the practical activity of demystifying our own relationships and 
perspectives. As capitalism insinuates itself into real contexts, embedding 
itself in the life-blood of other worlds, so the struggle in, against, and 
beyond it must think and act from these conjunctions.  
Sir Tipene O’Regan, who has been called the architect of modern 
corporate Māoridom due to his role as the chair of Ngāi Tahu throughout 
the Treaty-settlement negotiations, said that ‘mana and money sound 
very similar’.6 My view is that O’Regan is fundamentally mistaken, 
and this mistake is reflected in the form of the corporate iwi. O’Regan’s 
comparison is straightforward enough: in the old days, if you had a lot 
of mana you had a lot of power and prestige and an increased sphere of 
influence. These days, money stands in for mana and, indeed, for neoliberal 
Māori, mana motuhake appears as having money in the free market. My 
contention is that the concept that plays as central a role in te ao Māori 
as money does in the Pākehā world is not mana, but whakapapa. Marx 
describes money as a nexus rerum, the nodal point of connection between 
5  Stephen Turner, ‘Settler Dreaming,’ Memory Connection 1, no. 1 (2011): 114–26.
6  Colin James, ‘Transition from Tradition to Modernity,’ Māori Law Review, 12 
June 2013, https://maorilawreview.co.nz/2013/06/transition-from-tradition-to-
modernity-colin-james/
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all things.7 Whakapapa expresses a horizontal interrelation of all things, as 
well as their intergenerational layering. Money, likewise, signifies an entire 
system of relationships, the relationship of every commodity to every other 
commodity via the price at which they may be rendered equivalent for 
exchange. Money is the means by which commodities socialise. However, 
money blocks the experience of our congenital interrelation with our world, 
our whakapapa. Marx says as much in regard to the institution of monetised 
exchange in ancient Greece: ‘[monetary greed] is itself the community, and 
can tolerate none other standing above it’.8 Beyond the corrosive effects of 
the infinite accumulation money suggests is possible, it is apparent that the 
narrowness of the commodity-perspective—the world as value and, above 
all, exchange value; relationality being between commodities—blocks a 
more generous experience of, and communion with, the world. 
The attempt to envision a Māori Mārx is for me the process of 
attempting to gather together the strands across the worlds of my learning: 
the university and the wānanga, London and Pōrangahau. These worlds 
have been the historical subjects of contact, encounter, entanglement, 
and incomplete subsumption. In what follows, by no means definitive or 
complete, I describe some provisional materials for the construction of 
a Māori Mārx. Each name of this latter conjunction in no way signifies 
some unvariegated and consistent whole of thought to then be adhered 
to one another at points where their logics interlock: Māori ‘plus’ Marx. 
Instead, the attempt is to imagine a geometer, a meeting place capable of 
the connective and comparative geometry with which we might begin to 
discern the outline of a world free of the constraints of this one. 
As far as I am aware, literature that explicitly attempts to think through 
Marx from a Māori perspective is scant. Evan Te Ahu Poata-Smith’s 
brilliant PhD thesis provides a Marxist, historical-materialist account of 
7  Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough 
Draft), trans. Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin Books, 1993), 228. 
8  Marx, Grundrisse, 223. 
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Māori protest between 1968 and 1995.9 As Poata-Smith outlines, the 
emergence of militant worker organisations from the late-1960s such as Te 
Hōkoi, an underground newspaper, and the associated Maori Organisation 
on Human Rights, allied as they were to the Pākehā Left and the trade 
unions, might constitute a practical example of Māori politics informed 
by Marxism. My project here is somewhat different. My aim is to try to 
transform Marx’s thinking so that it might become more adequate to our 
context by thinking it through from the perspective of a constellation of 
Māori concepts.
Marx and Māori 
The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of 
production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws 
all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilisation. The cheap prices 
of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all 
Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians’ intensely obstinate 
hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of 
extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them 
to introduce what it calls civilisation into their midst, i.e., to become 
bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.10 
Even undercut, as this passage is, by a more antagonistic counterpoint, 
there can be little doubt that the Communist Manifesto tacitly expresses 
a unilinear conception of historical development. Granted its polemical 
charge, in this text non-Western societies, in their irresistible capitulation to 
capitalism, are seen to fester in the prehistory of their eventual transition to 
‘civilisation’. The Manifesto largely accepted the stadial or four-stage theory 
9  Evan Te Ahu Poata-Smith, The Political Economy of Māori Protest Politics, 1968–
1995: A Marxist Analysis of the Roots of Māori Oppression and the Politics of Resistance 
(PhD diss., University of Otago, 2002).
10  Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto: A Modern Edition 
(London: Verso, 2012), 47.
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of human development put forward by, among others, Adam Smith and the 
Physiocrats in the 1750s.11 The stadial theory viewed history as structured 
according to a single ascendant ark: according to the mode by which a 
society produced its subsistence, societies progressed from hunter-gatherer, 
to shepherding, to agriculture, finally reaching their apex in commercial 
society. The Manifesto memorably added to this trajectory a fifth stage 
that Smith somehow forgot to mention: communism. As communism 
would emerge from the overcoming of the capitalist mode of production, 
colonisation, the Manifesto implies, serves the purpose of accelerating the 
progress of non-Western societies towards their inevitable future. 
Marx’s reading on non-Western and non-capitalist peoples deepened 
in the following decades. Kevin Anderson summarises Marx’s vast yet 
neglected writings on these issues in his book Marx at the Margins.12 The 
writings that provide the source material for Anderson’s work are doubly 
marginal. On the one hand, they cover countries and peoples that, at the 
time of Marx’s writing, remained on the margins of capitalism, whether 
at its frontiers (Ireland, the United States), partially incorporated through 
colonialism (India, Indonesia, Algeria), or still beyond its reach (Russia, 
China, Poland). On the other hand, the writings themselves are from 
Marx’s journalism, letters, notes, and notebooks in which he excerpted 
and commented on texts as he read them. This apparent marginality 
when compared to his serious economic writings has been exaggerated by 
subsequent editorial decisions, with Engels’s focus on readying the second 
and third volumes of Capital for publication and the motivations of heavy-
handed Soviet editors under Stalin.13 Through this expansive research on 
non-Western and non-capitalist societies—wherein he paid particular 
attention to the intersections of race, gender, and nation with capitalism—
Marx continually complexified his conception of historical development, 
11  Ronald Meek,  Social Science and the Ignoble Savage (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 68.
12  Kevin Anderson, Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Non-
Western Societies (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010).
13  For a useful account of the travails of these texts in their ongoing journey toward 
publication see Anderson, Marx at the Margins, 247–252. 
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developing a far less deterministic, more layered and multivalent schema, 
one that left open the question of possible trajectories of transformation. 
Marx would continue to rethink and rework the way he conceived of the 
relationships between the earth and its peoples, and between those peoples, 
for the remainder of his life. Indeed, in the last few years of his life, Marx 
was so profoundly opened up by his readings on Indigenous societies that 
his thinking would become fundamentally transformed.
The Grundrisse, a series of notebooks Marx kept between 1857 and 
1858, marked an important shift in his conceptualisation of historical 
development. One of the key ways in which Marx complexified the stadial 
narrative was through the introduction of multiple geographical points of 
origin into his analysis, each subject to its own history of development. 
By the inclusion of ‘the Asiatic mode of production’, which could only be 
understood as following its own twists and turns, rather than following 
in Europe’s footprints, Marx rethought the conception of a single path.14 
Nevertheless, at this stage, the Grundrisse still implies that no one comes to 
communism except through capitalism.
Though they each have different characteristics, for Marx, the earliest 
forms of social organisation are all communal. In an extended discussion 
of ‘precapitalist’ societies, Marx describes three different communal forms 
under the headings of Asiatic, Graeco-Roman, and Germanic. It seems, at 
least superficially, that Marx would agree with Karl Popper, Peter Munz, and 
Rawiri Te Maire Tau that Māori were a tribal people at a comparable stage 
in development as the tribal Greeks or Germans.15 What is of interest, in the 
view of these latter authors, are factors that produce growth by dissolving 
the impediments to progress such as traditional beliefs and customs, thus 
enabling rationalisation. In this view, Ngāi Tahu are little different from 
14  Karl Marx, ‘1859 Preface,’ in A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977). 
15  Karl Popper, Open Society and its Enemies (Routledge Classics: Routledge, 2011), 
302; Peter Munz, ‘How the West was Won: Miracle or Natural Event?’ Philosophy 
of the Social Sciences 21, no. 2 (1991), 253–76; Rawiri Te Maire Tau, ‘The Death of 
Knowledge: Ghosts on the Plains,’ New Zealand Journal of History 35, no. 2 (2001), 
131–52.  
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the entrepreneurial Gauls, who turned their colonisation by the Romans 
into a business opportunity. Citing Munz, who himself is citing Popper, 
Tau makes the point that Māori are like the Indigenous inhabitants of Gaul 
and Germania who ‘were smart enough to seize the opportunities offered 
by Roman traders and Roman armies to enrich themselves and improve 
their standard of living’.16 Indeed, it was the ‘relentless pursuit’ of these 
opportunities that ‘eroded indigenous loyalties, customs and traditions’.17 
The specificities of each culture are mostly irrelevant to these authors, being 
only so many examples of static, irrational dogmas that require ‘culture 
clash’ (read colonisation) to set them onto the path of rationalisation.
Marx, on the other hand, is interested in the way in which a ‘living and 
active humanity’ in unity ‘with the natural, inorganic conditions of their 
metabolic exchange with nature’ becomes split in two: ‘a separation which is 
completely posited only in the relation of wage labour and capital’.18 Marx 
here comments on the historical process by which capitalism introduces 
a decisive cleft into a prior unity. It is through the violent processes of 
the clearance of direct producers from the land—enclosure, colonisation, 
extirpation, ‘so-called primitive-accumulation’—that the umbilical 
relationship between people and the land that nourishes them is broken.19 
In this vein, Raymond Williams was to note that the sharpening resolution 
between the terms ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ was a function of increasingly 
pervasive ‘real interaction’.20 It is this break that sets the human against 
nature, the subject against the object, and enshrines the individual as a 
discrete unit. Free in a double sense (freed from the means of production 
and so free to sell their labour-power), formerly direct producers must buy 
their means of subsistence on the market. Their relationship to the earth is 
no longer mediated through the collective but instead through money; they 
16  Tau, ‘The Death of Knowledge,’ 143.
17  Tau, ‘The Death of Knowledge,’ 143. 
18  Marx, Grundrisse, 489. 
19  Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, volume I, trans. Ben Fowkes 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1976), 871. 
20  Raymond Williams, Problems in Materialism and Culture: Selected Essays 
(London: Verso, 1997), 83.
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appear to each other as related through their private labours. Torn from the 
unity of their metabolic exchange with the earth, people stand in ‘dot-like 
isolation’.21 
Marx’s discussion of the unity of human activity with nature and its 
subsequent separation takes place within a historical-materialist account of 
the origins and development of property in pre-capitalist societies. Marx 
suggests that, because living in unity with the earth is the normal condition 
of humanity, while the separation of that unity is a historical process, the 
former does not require explanation. However, he is forced to provide some 
account of the previously lived unity between humanity and nature in order 
to better understand the process of its subsequent division. 
Marx defines ‘property’ in its prelapsarian state as belonging to a 
community, and belonging to a community as belonging to the land. 
Through this double belonging, individuals relate to the earth as their 
‘inorganic body’. As Marx states: ‘Property therefore means belonging to 
a clan (community) (having subjective-objective existence in it); and, by 
means of the relation of this community to the land and soil, [relating] to 
earth as the individual’s inorganic body’.22 Thus, prior to division, human 
beings’ relation to their natural conditions of production was as ‘natural 
presuppositions’ of the self, as the inorganic body of their subjectivity 
in which their subjectivity is realised: their ‘extended body’ (the earth).23 
This relationship is necessarily mediated by the community: ‘an isolated 
individual could no more have property in land and soil than he could 
speak’.24 Existence in a situation such as this is characterised by a unity of 
subject and object, subjectively as ourselves and objectively as the land, 
which Marx terms ‘subjective-objective’ existence.25 
Even couched, as it is, in the language internal to subsequent 
separation—‘property’, ‘subjective-objective’, ‘inorganic’—Marx’s under-
21  Marx, Capital, vol. I, 485, 496. 
22  Marx, Capital, vol. I, 492. 
23  Marx, Capital, vol. I, 485, 492.
24  Marx, Capital, vol. I, 485. 
25  Marx, Capital, vol. I, 492.
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standing is astonishingly resonant with the basic contours of Māori 
conceptions of being tangata whenua. Whenua, meaning land and 
placenta, reflects the fact that we are born from the womb of Papatūānuku. 
Tangata whenua is a relationship of belonging to the earth as the earth. 
The closest comparable concept to ‘property’ in the sense that Marx is 
discussing it is that of mana whenua. Mana whenua, mana meaning sacred 
authority and power for action, has two aspects: mana in the land and 
mana over the land. Mana in the land is issued by way of the whakapapa 
from Ranginui and Papatūānuku to their children; that is, all of creation, 
including tangata whenua. Mana over the land comes, still through the 
connections of whakapapa, from the prowess of more recent ancestors. The 
former can be referred to as mana tupuna (ancestors), the latter as mana 
tangata (people).26 These two aspects of mana are analogous with Marx’s 
conception of property in non-capitalist societies: the relationship to the 
earth as an extended body approximates mana tupuna; and the community 
that mediates the relationship of the individual to the earth approximates 
mana tangata. With regard to the latter, for Māori, an individual living in 
isolation was inconceivable.27 So too for Marx, whose analysis rejected the 
central mystifications of bourgeois social relations that saw the individual 
as existing prior to the social, the fondness of political economists for 
‘Robinson Crusoe stories’, as he termed it.28 An important contrast, or 
maybe a clarification, is that Papatūānuku is far from inorganic, being a 
living biological system with her own agency and personality. Although 
not explicitly stated, Marx acknowledges as much in his description of 
humans as the subjectivity of the objective earth. Marx’s contention here 
resonates with Māori Marsden’s assertion of ‘humankind as the envelope of 
the noosphere—conscious awareness of Papatūānuku’.29
Acknowledging Marx’s insight into some of the general premises of 
26  Edward Taihakurei Durie, Custom Law, Treaty Research Series (Wellington: 
Treaty of Waitangi Research Unit, 1994), 14–18.
27  Durie, Custom Law, 10–14.
28  Marx, Capital, vol. I, 169–170; Grundrisse, 83. 
29  Māori Marsden and Charles Te Ahukaramū Royal,  The Woven Universe: Selected 
Writings of Rev. Māori Marsden (Otaki: Estate of Rev. Māori Marsden, 2003), 46.
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an existence not divided by oppositions of use and exchange value, wage 
labour and capital, does not mean accepting the universal validity of his 
account. Marx’s Capital is primarily, of course, a critique of European social 
relations achieved through a critique of the classical political economists 
who gave voice to those relations. However, a key contradiction that arises 
within capitalist social relations is the apparent naturalness, and therefore 
universality, of capitalist forms, a dynamic that conceals the historical 
particularity and contingency of those forms. A related problem vexes Marx 
throughout the Grundrisse. Here, Marx struggles over the correct starting 
point for a properly historical-materialist critique of political economy, 
perhaps failing to find a satisfactory answer.30 Whereas Hegel began his 
Science of Logic from ‘being-in-general’ (pure being without any particular 
determinant or embodiment), for Marx this was an idealist starting point 
that emptied itself of all content.31 Once emptied of all content, the category 
attains universality at the highest level of abstraction. The result is that the 
philosophers merely find their own categories everywhere they look.
Inverting Hegel’s idealism, Marx initially suggests beginning with 
‘material production’.32 Marx concludes, however, that the notion of 
‘production in general’ abstracts from historical development and, although 
it brings out elements common to all production, it elides specificities and 
differences in its apparent unity. Ultimately, Marx finds, production in 
general is a category with which ‘no real historical stage of production can 
be grasped’.33 Marx poses two possible responses to this impasse: the first 
is to begin with ‘living wholes’, such as a given nation-state, and then, 
through analysis, to discover some ‘determinant, abstract, general relations 
such as division of labour, money, value, etc’.34 The second option works 
in the opposite direction, beginning with abstract, general relations and 
working on them to flesh out ‘living wholes’. While Marx is certain that the 
30  Marx, Grundrisse, 81–109; see also Martin Nicolaus’s forward to this edition, 35–38. 
31  Marx, Grundrisse, 101. 
32  Marx, Grundrisse, 83.
33  Marx, Grundrisse, 88. 
34  Marx, Grundrisse, 100. 
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second option is the correct one, he is immediately troubled by the fact that 
simple, abstract, general relations have their own history. Each would first 
need to be accounted for, leading to a necessary regression to a historical 
point zero from which it would then be possible to begin. Marx counters 
that the correct place to begin is with a category that holds a particularly 
central position within the specific social formation or epoch to be studied. 
At the close of the introduction to the Grundrisse, Marx remains uncertain, 
fudging the answer by stating that the initial category must be central to 
a particular social formation but also ‘more or less’ common to all social 
formations.
Commodity and Commune
Marx’s answer, as will become the famous departure point of Capital, is 
the simple commodity, divided and doubled as use/exchange value, the 
opposition from which Marx will dialectically unfurl the entire work. The 
commodity is Marx’s primary anthropological category of capitalist society. 
The contradiction at the seam of the commodity (use/exchange) is expressive 
of the contradictions of capitalism generally, a fragment of a hologram that 
reveals the entire image. Forgetting for a moment any judgements that 
order societies according to certain metrics, Marx enables a comparison 
between a society of reproduction in unity with the earth and a society 
organised around commodity production and exchange. Or, to modify his 
phrasing slightly, Marx enables an analysis of what becomes of Ranginui 
and Papatūānuku once subsumed within capitalist social relations.
He provides a beguiling response to this question towards the close of 
the third volume of Capital: 
Capital-profit (or better still capital-interest), land-ground rent, labor-
wages, this economic trinity as the connection between the components 
of value and wealth in general and its sources, completes the mystification 
of the capitalist mode of production, the reification of social relations, and 
the immediate coalescence of the material relations of production with 
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their historical and social specificity: the bewitched, distorted and upside-
down world haunted by Monsieur le Capital and Madame la Terre, who 
are at the same time social characters and mere things.35
Capital, arriving in Aotearoa with the nation-state and European law in 
tow, insinuates itself between Rangi and Papa and forces a nuptial with 
the earth. As its terrain for expansion, the ground of its reproduction, and 
the source of its raw materials, capital is lost without this unholy union. 
Following this ritual, the earth rises up in ghostly form. As a commodity, 
the earth is socialised as an apparition in the form of exchange value. 
Beneath the conjured apparition of the earth as exchange value, rendered 
inert through the severance of direct producers from the land, the earth 
becomes the object of ‘the right of the proprietors to exploit the earth’s 
surface, the bowels of the earth, the air and thereby the maintenance and 
development of life’.36 
Such is the inverted world of the commodity, its fetish-like character, 
in which relations between people take on the fantastic form of social 
relations between things. However, from the perspective of the unity prior 
to the instantiation of capitalism, the distinction that makes possible the 
inversion of people and things is absent. Within that unity, there is a general 
sociality amongst all things in the world. The world has its very existence 
through that sociality, as is described by the concept of whakapapa. 
However, from the appearance of Papatūānuku as lifeless, inorganic matter, 
her ghost is called to dance while her body, including humans, is subjected 
to exploitation, spoilage, and degradation. In Marx’s words: ‘all progress 
in capitalistic agriculture is a progress in the art, not only of robbing the 
labourer, but of robbing the soil; all progress in increasing the fertility of 
the soil for a given time, is a progress towards ruining the lasting sources of 
that fertility’.37 From a Māori perspective, however, the inversion that has 
human relations appear as social relations between things was, even prior 
35  Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, volume III, trans. David 
Fernbach (London: Penguin Books, 1981), 969. 
36  Marx, Capital, vol. III, 909. 
37  Marx, Capital, vol. I, 638. 
57
to inversion, still only a partial view. Humans and things had always had 
social relations between and amongst themselves. Papatūānuku is a general 
field of sociality. 
Marx began his account of capital with the commodity, containing 
as it does the kernel of capitalism’s contradictions. Yet the commodity is a 
category specific to capitalism as it had developed in the West. In the last 
decade of his life, Marx became both increasingly hostile to colonialism and 
deeply engaged with, in Teodor Shanin’s phrase, ‘the very heterogeneity of 
structure and motion around the globe’.38 The commodity could not provide 
the point of departure for the type of comparative analysis adequate to this 
heterogeneity. A thinker of process and motion, whose thought remained 
in process and motion for the entirety of his life, late Marx devoted himself 
to the understanding of non-Western and non-capitalist societies as part of 
his attempt to reformulate his approach. Testament to the fact that much of 
the Marxism that followed Marx carried nothing of the motion or vitality 
of his thought, some of the foremost interpreters of Marx in the period 
after his death considered the new direction Marx’s thought took in the last 
few years of his life as a result of senility.39 Why else would Marx abandon 
the serious scientific work of Capital in favour of reading about people who 
had to catch up to capitalism before they could dream of communism?
A major indication of the transformation Marx’s thought underwent 
throughout this period is the letter he wrote in response to a question from 
Vera Zasulich, a young Russian revolutionary.40 Two years before Marx 
died, Zasulich wrote to him in February 1881 seeking clarification on a 
question that she considered to be ‘of life and death’ import for the socialist 
struggle in Russia.41 Zasulich asked whether the rural commune in Russia 
was, freed from domination by the state, capable of developing in a socialist 
38  Teodor Shanin, Late Marx and the Russian Road: Marx and ‘the Peripheries of 
Capitalism’ (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983), 22. 
39  Shanin, Late Marx, 19, 32. 
40  Zasulich was in exile at the time of writing. No armchair revolutionary, she had 
shot the governor of St Petersburg as retribution for him flogging a prisoner: Shanin, 
Late Marx, 178. 
41  Shanin, Late Marx, 98.
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direction, or if it was destined to perish. If the former was the case then the 
‘revolutionary socialist must devote all [their] strength to the liberation and 
development of the commune’.42 But if the rural commune was an archaic 
dead-end, then all that was left to Russian revolutionaries:
was more or less ill founded calculations as to how many decades it will take 
for the Russian peasant’s land to pass into the hands of the bourgeoisie, and 
how many centuries it will take for capitalism in Russia to reach something 
like the level of development already attained in Western Europe.43  
Marx spent three weeks working intensely on a response, producing four 
lengthy drafts before finally sending a shorter version. Marx was hardly 
unprepared for the question. According to Jenny Marx, in 1870 Marx 
had begun to teach himself Russian so that he could read Russian sources 
directly. In the years that followed, he had amassed a vast library of Russian 
books, taking voluminous notes on his reading. In his answer to Zasulich, 
Marx was clear: his research had convinced him that ‘the [rural] commune 
is the fulcrum for social regeneration in Russia’.44 Ironically, this was taken 
to be an entirely heretical stance from the perspective of Russian Marxists 
and the letter would not be published until it was discovered in 1924.45
In one of the drafts of the letter, Marx provided more detail: ‘Precisely 
because it is contemporaneous with capitalist production, the rural 
commune may appropriate for itself all the positive achievements and this 
without undergoing its frightful vicissitudes’.46 Marx and Engels would 
confirm much the same sentiment in an 1882 preface to the second Russian 
edition of The Communist Manifesto, the last of Marx’s writings published 
during his lifetime. As is made clear in this preface, Marx had thoroughly 
transformed in his thinking any notions of unilinear evolutionary stages, 
42  Shanin, Late Marx, 98.
43  Vera Zasulich, ‘A Letter to Marx (Feburary/March 1881),’ in Shanin, Late Marx, 
98–99.  
44  Karl Marx, ‘The Reply to Zasulich (8 March 1881),’ in Shanin, Late Marx, 124. 
45  David Ryazanov, ‘The Discovery of the Drafts,’ in Shanin, Late Marx, 127–133.
46  Shanin, Late Marx, 105.
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opening onto a far more heterogeneous field of possibilities in the 
relationships between different social forms. 
At the time of his response, Marx’s readings on non-Western and non-
capitalist societies had greatly expanded. Marx’s notebooks from between 
1879 and 1882 run to some 300,000 words of excerpts and notations. 
Focusing mainly on works by anthropologists, Marx’s research spans Indian 
history and village culture; Dutch colonialism and the village economy in 
Indonesia; gender and kinship patterns among Native Americans and in 
ancient Greece, Rome, and Ireland; and communal and private property in 
Algeria and Latin America.47 
The literature on the notebooks from this period is slim, not least 
because of their polyglot texture, the multiple languages used even within 
single sentences, and their incompleteness. Lawrence Krader, who made 
about half of the materials available for the first time in 1972, surmised at 
the end of his lengthy introduction that the notebooks’ ‘incomplete form 
has nevertheless indicated the transition of Marx from the restriction of the 
abstract generic human to the empirical study of human societies’.48 It is 
perhaps for this reason that E P Thompson had regarded Marx as, in these 
last years of his life, spiralling back to the concerns of his Paris youth,49 
where, in his 1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, he had been 
absorbed by Hegel’s discovery of ‘the formation of the earth, its coming to 
be, as a process of self-generation’.50   
Raya Dunayevskaya regarded the notebooks as ‘epoch making’, 
expressive of the radical open-endedness of Marx’s thought, and providing 
a novel position from which to reinterpret his life’s works. The Marx of 
47  Anderson, Marx at the Margins, 196; Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Marx-
Engels Gesamtausgabe IV/27 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, forthcoming). 
48  Karl Marx, The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx: Studies of Morgan, Phear, 
Maine, Lubbock, transc. and ed. with an intro. Lawrence Krader (Assen: Von Gorcum, 
1974); Krader, ‘Introduction,’ in Marx, The Ethnological Notebooks, 85.
49  E.P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory, or An Orrery of Errors (London: Merlin 
Press, 1995), 220. 
50  Karl Marx and Lucio Colletti, Karl Marx: Early Writings, trans. Rodney 
Livingstone and Gregar Benton (London: Penguin Classics, 1992), 356. 
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the notebooks was ‘returning to probe the origin of humanity, not for 
purposes of discovering new origins, but for perceiving new revolutionary 
forces, their reason, or as Marx called it, in emphasizing a sentence of 
Morgan, “powers of the mind”’.51 While Dunayevskaya is no doubt correct 
that Marx gathered materials and perspectives to bear on the present, she 
introduces a more reductive teleology than is found in his own writing. 
She conflates Marx’s research into ancient society and contemporary 
non-Western societies as both being exemplary of previous stages in the 
historical development of the West. 
As Krader suggests, the notebooks actually show the thoroughgoing 
anti-teleological charge of Marx’s thinking, as well as his refusal to apply an 
unmodified Darwinian evolutionary schema to human culture. In Krader’s 
words, Marx’s criticism was of ‘evolution made over into evolutionism, 
a doctrine comforting and comfortable to the sustainers of the given 
civilisation as the telos of evolutionary progress’.52 Marx noted how these 
doctrines reconstructed the past so that the mores of a particular society 
became the end-result of an evolutionary process and so could serve as 
the justification for the domination and exploitation of other peoples. The 
heterogeneous themes of the notebooks are no accident. Marx’s intense 
focus was on Indigenous societies, with particular emphasis on the relations 
between men and women in egalitarian societies, the changes over time 
within societies, colonialism, and technological advances in agriculture. 
As we know from Marx’s response to Zasulich, these insights had a vital 
bearing on the struggle of Marx’s present. 
The most voluminous notes are found in Marx’s reading of the 
anthropologist Henry Morgan’s work on Native Americans. Marx 
painstakingly excerpted such details as the animals from which each clan 
descended, the precise description of certain rituals, and the Indigenous 
words for things. Likewise, Marx was enthralled by the democratic 
practices of the Iroquois and the power and participation of women within 
51  Raya Dunayevskaya, Women’s Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution: Reaching 
for the Future (Wayne State University Press, 1996), 221.
52  Krader, ‘Introduction,’ 84.
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those practices. A particularly fine formulation of the way in which Marx’s 
thought was transformed by his textual encounter with Indigenous peoples 
is given by Franklin Rosemont; Marx came to understand: 
the true complexity of ‘primitive’ societies as well as their grandeur, their 
essential superiority, in real human terms, to the degraded civilization 
founded on the fetishism of commodities. In a note written just after his 
conspectus of Morgan we find Marx arguing that ‘primitive communities 
had incomparably greater vitality than the Semitic, Greek, Roman and a 
fortiori the modern capitalist societies.’ Thus Marx had come to realize 
that, measured according to the ‘wealth of subjective human sensuality,’ 
as he had expressed it in the 1844 manuscripts, Iroquois society stood 
much higher than any of the societies ‘poisoned by the pestilential breath 
of civilization.’ Even more important, Morgan’s lively account of the 
Iroquois gave him a vivid awareness of the actuality of indigenous peoples, 
and perhaps even a glimpse of the then-undreamed of possibility that such 
peoples could make their own contributions to the global struggle for 
human emancipation.53
In the next section, I return to this fundamental opening at the close of 
Marx’s thought, thinking Marx from the perspective of this transformation. 
This is accomplished in combination with a provisional attempt to read 
Marx from the perspective of a Māori conceptual orientation. This seems to 
me the process Marx started, in whatever limited, one-sided way he could, 
through his own readings on Indigenous societies. 
Māori Mārx
The first point to note in a comparison between Marx’s style of thinking 
and a Māori style of thought, other than the asymmetry of a comparison 
between a person and a people, is a shared pattern described by the spiral. 
53  Franklin Rosemont, ‘Karl Marx and the Iroquois,’ in Arsenal: Surrealist 
Subversion, ed. Franklin Rosemont (Chicago: Black Swan Press, 1989), 201–213.
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To take a visual example, the curled tendrils of the koru fern—the word 
meaning a fold, loop, or coil—so important to Māori thought, also works 
as a diagram of Marx’s dialectical mode of presentation.54 
Figure 1. Koru fern – image by Huriana Kopeke-Te Aho, 2019
Both Hegelian and Marxian conceptions of the dialectic, and the concept of 
whakapapa, all express a thinking of and in movement. That is, a relational 
thinking of process, cycle, and development wherein the relation is prior to 
the terms constituted by that relation. Although Hegel chose the figure of 
the circle, always multiple and in movement, as his diagram of the dialectic, 
it is hard not to detect the curls of the koru in his descriptions:
But universal movement as concrete is a series of manifestations 
(Gestaltungen) of the Spirit. This series should not be pictured as a straight 
line but as a circle, a return into itself. This circle has as its circumference 
a large number of circles; one development is always a movement passing 
54  The relationship between Hegel’s dialectic and the Māori notion of wānanga 
(study) has been noted by Ruakere Hond, ‘The Concept of Wānanga at Parihaka,’ in 
Parihaka: The Art of Passive Resistance, eds. Te Miringa Hohaia, Gregory O’Brian, and 
Lara Strongman (New Zealand: Victoria University Press, 2001), 82.
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through many developments; the totality of this series is a succession of 
developments curving back on itself; and each particular development is a 
stage of the whole. Although there is progress in development, it does not 
go forward into (abstract) infinity but rather turns back into itself.55
Working from the other direction, it is equally hard not to be struck by the 
dialectical nature of Māori Marsden’s account of the whakapapa of creation: 
The genealogy of creation occurs in stages in which one order, after it 
has reached its culmination, takes a giant leap forward to be succeeded 
by a radical departure resulting in the introduction of a new stage. That 
process is illustrated by the stages, void—root foundations—energy-
consciousness—spirit—form—a new space/time continuum—Ranginui 
and Papatūānuku.56 
The dialectical character of the Māori account of creation does not end 
with Ranginui and Papatūānuku. In fact, it is odd that in Tau’s account 
of Māori thought as lacking critical distance, leading to its confinement 
in mirror thinking, he does not mention the Māori Enlightenment.57 As 
one common account has it, the first children of Rangi and Papa became 
frustrated at living in the darkness of their parents’ tight embrace. After 
much dialogue and debate, they resolved to split their parents apart, 
allowing light to enter the world. Tane, the atua of the forest and knowledge, 
one of whose forms is the mighty Kauri tree, inverted himself, placing his 
feet against the sky and his shoulders against the earth, thus separating his 
parents. This is the way that Te Ao Mārama (the world of light, the realm 
of being) was born from Te Pō (the night, the realm of becoming). The 
55  Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel’s Idea of Philosophy with a New 
Translation of Hegel’s Introduction to the History of Philosophy, ed. Quentin Lauer 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 1971), 80. Marx’s figure of the dialectic is the 
ellipse: see Thomas Weston, ‘Marx on the Dialectics of Elliptical Motion,’ Historical 
Materialism 20, no. 4 (2012): 3–38.   
56  Marsden, Woven Universe, 45. 
57  An enlightenment fundamentally different from its European counterpart. Tau, 
‘The Death of Knowledge.’
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etymology of the term ‘dialectic’ is from the Greek ‘dia’, meaning split 
in two, and ‘logos’, meaning reason; hence: debate, decision, reasoning by 
splitting in two. Tane’s division of his parents after ferocious debate is the 
dialectical act par excellence. 
From the perspective of the shared dialectical texture or spiral rhythms 
of both modes of thinking—Māori and Marx—I propose to pick up 
the thread of the multiplication and delinearisation of trajectories of 
development within societies and between them. In a compelling series of 
articles entitled ‘Once Were Communists’, the Pākehā Marxist and trade 
unionist Terry Coggan recounts an anecdote from his youth:
At a public meeting in the 1970s, I heard Maori rights activist Syd Jackson 
say that Europeans came to Aotearoa (New Zealand) with a culture that 
was ‘materially superior’ but ‘spiritually inferior’ to that of the indigenous 
Maori people they encountered. As a newly minted Marxist, I knew that 
by material and spiritual culture he meant the economic base, the legal and 
political superstructure, and the forms of social consciousness particular 
to each society, even if I wasn’t sure how value judgments like ‘inferior’ or 
‘superior’ belonged with such a scientific analysis.58
There is undoubtedly something valuable in the distinction drawn by 
Jackson in describing the difference between Māori and Pākehā at the 
moment of encounter, although some might find ‘spirit’ too Hegelian a 
category for a materialist dialectics. For Marx, the totality of the relations of 
production constitutes the economic base; or, as he puts it, they constitute 
‘the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a 
legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms 
of social consciousness’.59 The conception Marx outlines in the passage 
just cited has regularly been taken up by Marxists as a strict economic 
determinism, one that Engels would later rail against for rendering Marx’s 
58  Terry Coggan, ‘Once Were Communists – Part One: The First Communism,’ 
A Communist at Large, 6 December 2014, https://convincingreasons.wordpress.
com/2014/12/06/once-were-communists-part-one-the-first-communism/
59  Marx, ‘1859 Preface,’ A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. 
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proposition ‘meaningless, abstract, absurd’.60 Coggan, at the time of the 
anecdote a ‘newly minted Marxist’, is too quick to map Jackson’s terms 
onto a cruder reading of base and superstructure. Nonetheless, the anecdote 
opens up the question of the multiple registers of progress and the values 
whereby development along these axes might be evaluated. 
Historical materialism, where it remains beholden to a rigid schema 
according to which the economic base determines all superstructural 
elements, eclipses its own imagination. If the forces of production are 
the only agency through which social forms evolve, then emancipation 
starts to look like a technological problem. And perhaps it is, but not 
the technology of a lifeless materialism that thinks of matter as inert and 
technology as solely a matter of objects. Technological objects, whether 
handheld gadgets or global infrastructure, are, of course, thoroughly 
social. But acknowledging this does not necessarily free us from the idea 
that technology is simply a matter of objects, a narrow perspective that 
monopolises our imaginations. If the model of base and superstructure is 
wound down into a more complex, differential unity comprising multiple 
agencies, then the other aspect of technology is able to step into the light: 
namely, the techniques of sociality as they are imagined and elaborated in 
thought and in practice. Techniques of sociality are all those technologies 
that mediate and enable difference without needing to tame it, their level of 
advancement being decided by the degree to which they secure and increase 
both independence and interdependence. 
Early Pākehā colonists noted the radically democratic and egalitarian 
aspects of Māori society in comparison to that of Europeans.61 Many 
agreed with the sentiments of Francis Dart Fenton when he observed, in 
1857, that: 
No system of government that the world ever saw can be more democratic 
than that of the Maoris. The chief alone has no power. The whole tribe 
60  Friedrich Engels, ‘Engels to J. Bloch In Berlin, London, September 21, 1890,’ 
New International 1, no.3 (1934): 81–85.
61  On this point, see Vincent O’Malley,  The Meeting Place: Māori and Pākehā 
Encounters, 1642–1840 (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2014), 197.
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deliberate on every subject, not only politically on such as are of public 
interest, but even judicially they hold their ‘komitis’ on every private 
quarrel. In ordinary times the vox populi determines every matter, both 
internal and external. The system is a pure pantocracy, and no individual 
enjoys influence or exercises power, unless it originates with the mass and 
is expressly or tacitly conferred by them.62 
Likewise, the process of pōwhiri of manuhiri onto a marae continues to 
provide a rich expression of the advanced social technology of tikanga in 
handling difference in ways that do not come at the expense of autonomy. 
In contrast, the record of the earliest European arrivals, when read from a 
perspective even slightly sympathetic to Māori, provides repetitive evidence 
of callous insensitivity to (even the possibility of the existence of ) local 
protocols and of violence as an immediate response to any perceived slight, 
minor provocation, or even their own incomprehension. Pākehā, when they 
arrived, must have appeared to Māori as having very primitive social skills. 
Marx’s categories such as the commodity are those of an 
‘endoanthropology’, too internal to his own society to be able to provide 
the basis of comparison between societies without presupposing the 
universal existence of the commodity. While the commodity is of particular 
importance within capitalism, it is not more or less common to all social 
formations. Where the commodity might seem to be a more or less universal 
category is in its useful, or thingly aspect.
Although the commodity cannot provide a universal basis of 
comparison, this does not mean that it is precluded from providing a 
point of comparison. A question that emerges from such a comparison is 
what the commodity fetish that arrives with Pākehā would look like from 
a Māori perspective. An important difference follows from an absence of 
the opposition between use and exchange in te ao Māori prior to European 
arrival. Because of the absence of this distinction, the apparent inversion 
that sees relations between people ‘appear as relations between material 
objects, instead of revealing them plainly’, remains a limited or bracketed 
62  F.D. Fenton, ‘Report as to Native Affairs in the Waikato District March 1857,’ 
Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives, E-1c (1860), 11.
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perspective.63 For Māori, there was instead always a field of interrelation 
and co-constitution, whakapapa, a sociality between and amongst ourselves 
and the world. To invert the inversion enacted by the commodity would 
be to remain blinded as to the fullness of the dynamic inter-relationality of 
everything with everything else. 
Reading Marx from an Indigenous perspective, Glen Coulthard 
transforms Marx’s concept of ‘modes of production’ into the more expansive 
‘modes of life’.64 Rather than Marx’s more anthropocentric notion of relations 
of production conditioned by forces of production, a mode of life refers to 
‘a field of relationships of things to each other’.65 What I call a ‘geometry 
of life’ tries to think the epistemological implications of the concept of 
mode of life.66 A geometry of life—the patternings traced in a world by 
the flux of its constituent sociality—gains a third dimension through the 
development of a ‘geomentality’.67 A geomentality is a relationship with 
the earth that issues from the particular rhythms and patterns of a world 
expressed as a particular enunciative fold within it (for example, a human). 
As a rhythmic aspect, a geometry of life has a temporal dimension that 
is given through the metabolic interchange with the earth, the tempo of 
which is particular to a mode of life. The comparative, historical, vital, and 
sacred materialism approached by the conception of a geometry of life is an 
initial and provisional methodological formulation of a Māori Mārx.
A geometry of life seeks to remain open such that a priori 
reconfigurations of other worlds are lessened. Absolute symmetry or 
complete non-distortion of perspective remains, however, an unachievable 
purity that would be likely to be entirely sterile, even if it were possible. 
The point is not to come to an objective view from nowhere but instead 
to reach a meeting place where different perspectives can be held in their 
63  Marx, Capital, vol. I, 169.
64  Coulthard, ‘Place against Empire,’ 1–34. 
65  Coulthard, ‘Place against Empire,’ 16. 
66  Simon Barber, Geometries of Life (PhD diss., Goldsmiths, University 
of London, 2018).
67  The term is taken from Hong-Key Yoon, ‘On Geomentality,’ GeoJournal 25, no. 
4 (1991): 387–92. 
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difference, with the hope of coming to novel, collective, and experimental 
constructions. A geometry of life is, then, a provisional orientation from 
which to begin the transformation of Marx’s thinking from an Indigenous 
perspective. 
Proletarian Papatūānuku
Coulthard has convincingly argued that, although Capital acknowledges 
a double moment of dispossession and proletarianisation, Marx’s interest 
is for the most part taken up with the latter. Coulthard suggests moving 
away from Marx’s more capital-centric analysis to one in which land is 
more central and in which dispossession becomes a more sustained focus. 
This speaks more directly to Indigenous experience.68 In light of this, my 
claim that Papatūānuku is best understood as proletarian might seem 
incongruent.
What I hope to make apparent via this phrasing is that the process of 
dispossession of people from the land is also one in which the land is forced 
to ‘work’ in the factory. The farm/field is a factory in which the industrial 
rhythms of capitalist agriculture sever and supplant those of the metabolism 
of people living in intimate, umbilical connection with the earth. Whereas 
Papatūānuku is formerly the means of reproduction of life on the planet, 
once dominated by capital this function is devalued, and her ability to 
do so lessens as she is impoverished by increasingly frenetic exploitation. 
Capitalist agriculture produces a rift by demanding more from the earth 
than it is able to give. The profit motive that demands that production 
increase in each business cycle is in direct relation to the increasing 
poverty of the earth. Capital tries to staunch this deficit by increasing its 
violent means of technological intervention. The literal Latin meaning of 
proletariat, ‘those with many offspring’, was used in its ancient Roman 
sense to designate the lowest class of people, whose members, poor and 
exempt from taxes, were useful to the republic only for the production of 
68  Coulthard, ‘Place against Empire.’ 
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children.69 It is in this impoverished reproductive sense that Papatūānuku, 
as dominated by capital, is proletarian.  
Because of the particular relationship of humans, understood as 
tangata whenua (people of the land, born of Papatūānuku), to her, the 
dispossession of people from the land is from Papatūānuku’s perspective a 
theft of her land people. As Māori Marsden explains: 
The function of humankind as the envelope of the noosphere—conscious 
awareness of Papatūānuku—is to advance her towards the omega point of 
fulfilment. This will mean a radical departure from the modern concept of 
man as the centre of the universe towards an awareness that man’s destiny 
is intimately bound up with the destiny of the earth. . . . Thus will he 
embrace a holistic view which encompasses all life. He will thus learn to 
flow with and ride upon the vibrant energies of the Cosmic stream. . . . 
So will he overcome his sense of isolation, that estrangement which breeds 
despair—the encounter with nothingness. Only then will he recognise 
inwardly that he has come home.70 
And so the dispossession that produces the worker as a subject set against 
inert nature is also the inversion of Papatūānuku’s own consciousness 
against herself.
A recent and celebrated case, the result of many years of struggle by the 
various iwi and hapū involved, marks the attempt to return consciousness 
and voice to Papatūānuku. Te Awa Tupua (the Whanganui River Claims 
Settlement) Act 2017 bestows legal personhood on the Whanganui 
River.71 By way of the act, two people are appointed by the Crown and iwi 
associated with the river to be te Pou Tupua (guardians of the river) and to 
speak on the river’s behalf.72 This is no doubt a considerable achievement 
69  Cedric Robinson, An Anthropology of Marxism (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2001), 17.
70  Marsden, Woven Universe, 46.
71  New Zealand Parliament, Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) 
Act 2017, Public Act no. 7 (20 March 2017). 
72  Former MP Dame Tariana Turia and educator Turama Hawira have been 
appointed the first Te Pou Tupua.
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that provides significant protections for the river, also opening the law up to far 
more dynamic and creative processes than have been previously available to it.73 
The decision has become one of international renown, and will no 
doubt find resonance with many working in the wake of new materialisms, 
plural ontologies, or post-humanism. That a river might be given voice 
is a practical fulfilment of the hope expressed by Bruno Latour for a 
‘parliament of things’.74 However, both legal personhood and parliament 
are, of course, bourgeois forms entirely consistent with the continued 
domination of the earth by capital. In the terms of first law, the Whanganui 
River’s subject–objecthood, understood as a relational agency, is expressed 
in the multiple taniwhā that inhabit it. A taniwhā is a relational being that 
inhabits a body of water and acts as kaitiaki of the health and vitality of that 
water, including that of all those things nourished by it. A taniwhā is an 
expression of the field of reciprocity and cohabitation whereby the health 
of the river is also the health of the communities it sustains. The latter are 
in a position of responsibility and obligation to the river as reciprocity for 
their own existence. 
As against the indivisible individual of the river as legal person,75 I 
am instead describing the unbounded relational totality of the river 
expressed by taniwhā, tupuna, atua, tangata whenua—an expression of 
the collective powers of the earth. It is through this agency, and by way 
of our participation in this ensemble, that we might begin to fulfil our 
responsibilities to Papatūānuku and to each other by negating the ruinous 
exploitation of her (including us) by capital. That is, the liberation of the 
earth by the coming to self-consciousness of proletarian Papatūānuku. 
This will not be possible if our imaginations remain constrained by the 
forms of capital, whether legal, economic, ideological, or otherwise. The 
capitalist mode of life forecloses, however inconclusively, that of Māori, 
73  Marama Muru-Lanning, Tupuna Awa: People and Politics of the Waikato River 
(Auckland: University of Auckland Press, 2016).
74  Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2006).
75  ‘Te Awa Tupua is an indivisible and living whole’: New Zealand Parliament, Te 
Awa Tupua Act 2017, 2:12.  
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as te ao Pākehā, the commodity-world, asserts itself as the only possible 
reality. A negation of this negation remains open to us: Papatūānuku might 
this time heave capital off of herself. This is due to the vast manaakitanga 
shown Pākehā by Māori. That many Pākehā fail to see the door Māori hold 
open, or to see the possibilities for our co-constitution and cohabitation 
beyond relationships of domination, is due to the violence carried by 
Pākehā in the readiness to refuse, extinguish, or flatten other modes of life, 
precluding us from sharing the energies and imagination of this vision. 
Thus, the unending struggle by Māori, which finds one present expression 
in the patient work of the Matike Mai collective for a constitution based on 
first law, appears to Pākehā as an attempt to undermine sovereignty.76 The 
continuation of violence is upheld against the offer of open aroha.
Papatūānuku calls out to us now, her karanga tinged with urgent 
lament. Responding to this call, Marx, with his spiralling investigations into 
the advanced social technologies of Indigenous peoples and the immense 
productive forces of capital, arrives at this hui alive and among us. A new 
world struggles to be born. Either we breathe life into that world and learn 
to breathe its life or we suffocate in this one. Tihei mauri ora! 
76  He Whakaaro Here Whakaumu mō Aotearoa: The Report of Matike Mai Aotearoa – 
The Independent Working Group on Constitutional Transformation (2016), available at, 
https://nwo.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/MatikeMaiAotearoa25Jan16.pdf
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